More than 2.37 billion EMV smart card-based payment cards are in use worldwide, responsible for 30 percent of all card-present payments. Yet, a series of signifi cant vulnerabilities makes EMV vulnerable to the preplay attack. Specifi cally, weak and defective random number generators and various protocol failures leave the EMV system open to fraud at scale. T he leading system for smart card-based payments worldwide is EMV (named aft er its original inventors-Europay, MasterCard, and Visa), also known as "chip and PIN. " More than 96 percent of card-present transactions in Europe use EMV technology, and it is starting to be introduced in the US too. In fact, more than 2.37 billion cards are in use worldwide.
T he leading system for smart card-based payments worldwide is EMV (named aft er its original inventors-Europay, MasterCard, and Visa), also known as "chip and PIN. " More than 96 percent of card-present transactions in Europe use EMV technology, and it is starting to be introduced in the US too. In fact, more than 2.37 billion cards are in use worldwide.
Th e EMV integrated circuit card technology supersedes the familiar magnetic strip on cards. A cryptographic protocol is executed between a chip card and bank servers based on a message authentication code (MAC) over transaction data, including an unpredictable number. Because they contain a smart-card chip, EMV cards are more diffi cult to clone than traditional magnetic-strip cards. Yet, in the decade since EMV's introduction, a series of signifi cant vulnerabilities has emerged.
We discovered two EMV protocol fl aws: there's no terminal ID to identify involved parties, and the nonce isn't generated by the relying party. Together, these make EMV vulnerable to the preplay att ack, during which malicious users replay prerecorded transaction data from a target card at a later time. Th is powerful att ack is possible because of a protocol fl aw, possibly exploited in conjuction with weak random number generators (RNGs). Th ese fl aws can also be exploited using a man-in-the-middle device between the terminal and the acquirer, or malware installed at an ATM or point of sale (POS) terminal.
Our investigation started when we discovered that EMV implementers oft en use counters, timestamps, or homegrown algorithms to supply the nonce. Here, we describe the survey methodology we developed to chart the scope of this weakness, evidence from ATM and terminal experiments in the fi eld, and our proof-ofconcept att ack implementation. Finally, we explore why these fl aws evaded detection until now.
Th e Smoking Gun
Th e case that kicked off the research we report here began when a Maltese customer of HSBC, Alex Gambin, complained about ATM transactions that were wrongly billed to his card in Palma, Majorca, on 29
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June 2011, after he bought a meal at a restaurant there. He was refused a refund and asked us for advice. We observed that one of the fields in the log file, the unpredictable number (UN), looked rather predictable, as Table 1 shows. The UN appears to consist of a 17-bit fixed value followed by a 15-bit counter that cycles every three minutes.
If the UN generated by an ATM is in fact predictable, then attackers with temporary access to a card (say, in a Mafia-owned shop) could precompute the authentication codes needed to draw cash from that ATM at some time in the future. We discovered that many ATMs generate poor random numbers, making a preplay attack possible. What's worse, a flaw in the protocol also lets attackers substitute a precomputed transaction even when the RNG is sound.
We informed the industry about our findings in early 2012 so that ATM software could be patched. We are now publishing the details of our study to provide customers with evidence to pursue wrongly denied claims and to enable the crypto, security, and bank regulation communities to learn valuable lessons.
Fraud Using EMV Technology
With EMV technology, each bank card contains a smart-card chip that authenticates transaction data using a MAC calculated with a symmetric key shared between the card and the card-issuing bank. The chip protects against card counterfeiting. However, EMV cards haven't cut fraud as much as the industry hoped, as Figure 1 shows. Attackers have adapted in several ways. First, they moved from card cloning to card-not-present transactions, which include Internet, mail-order, and phone-based payments.
Second, attackers started making magnetic-strip clones of EMV cards. Instead of entering PINs only at ATMs, customers now also enter their PINs in POS terminals, which are much easier to tamper with. 1 Attackers steal card data and PINs and then use magnetic-strip clones in countries such as the US where ATMs still accept magnetic-strip cards.
Third, several technical vulnerabilities have emerged. For example, attackers can use a stolen EMV card at a POS device without knowing the PIN by using a manin-the-middle device to trick a terminal into believing that the correct PIN was entered while the card The principals are the card, the ATM or POS device, and the issuer. The third phase is of interest for the preplay attack. In transaction authentication, the ATM or POS terminal sends the card the amount, currency, date, terminal verification results (results of various checks the ATM or POS terminal performed), and a nonce (the unpredictable number in EMV terminology). The card responds with a MAC known as the authorization request cryptogram (ARQC), which is calculated over these records; the application transaction counter (ATC; a 16-bit number stored by the card and incremented for each transaction); and the issuer application data (IAD; a proprietary data field used to carry information from the card to its issuer).
The ARQC is sent to the issuer, which verifies it and checks whether funds are available, that the card hasn't been reported stolen, and that the transaction doesn't look suspicious. It then returns to the ATM or POS terminal an authorization response code (ARC) and an authorization response cryptogram (ARPC). The card verifies the ARPC (which is typically a MAC over the ARQC XORed with the ARC) and returns an authenticated settlement record known as a transaction certificate (TC), which can be sent to the issuer immediately or some time later as part of a settlement process. All these MACs are computed using a key shared between the card and the issuing bank, and so the ATM or POS terminal can't verify them.
In a normal EMV transaction, the card sends an ARQC to prove that it's alive, present, and engaged in the transaction. The ATM or POS device relies on the issuer to verify this and authorize the transaction. The UN ensures that transactions are unique and tied to a specific terminal. However, if attackers can predict UNs, they can mount preplay attacks that are indistinguishable from card cloning. That is, attackers collect authentication data at one terminal and play it to one or more other verifying parties later. For example, a tampered terminal in a store can collect card details and ARQCs from a victim for later use at an ATM or POS terminal whose UN can be predicted or manipulated. 
EMV Protocol Flaws
The first protocol flaw is that the specification doesn't require the terminal's ID in authenticated messages, which is a classic mistake. 4 Although the EMV framework can support authenticating the terminal ID through a list of fields specifying what data should be sent to the card to generate the ARQC (the CDOL1), the standard cryptogram format developed by Visa (version 10) requires only the terminal country code in the computation of the MAC. The second flaw is in the protocol architecture: the terminal generates the random number, but the issuing bank relies on it. Therefore, the issuer depends on the merchant for transaction freshness, but the merchant might not have the incentive to provide it and might be unable to deliver it correctly because of a lack of end-to-end authentication. In fact, the terminal could be collusive.
A formal analysis of EMV was published in 2011, but this flaw wasn't discovered. 5 The study made two errors. First, it modeled the UN as a fresh nonce, even though EMV doesn't require this. Second, it also modeled the issuer and terminal as the same principal, which they are not; the terminal communicates with an acquirer-that is, the merchant's bank-which in turn sends the transactions to a switch that finally relays the transactions to the issuer.
Preplay Attacks Based on a Weak RNG
The EMV protocol designers didn't think carefully about what was required for the UN to be truly unpredictable. The specifications and conformance testing procedures simply required that four consecutive transactions performed by the terminal should have unique UNs (see test 2CM.085.00 6 ). Thus, a rational implementer in a hurry would simply use a counter.
Since we disclosed this flaw, the EMV 4.2 specification now offers guidance on generating the UN, but previous versions left the algorithm entirely up to implementers. Even the suggested construction (hash or XOR of previous ARQCs, transaction counter, and time) wouldn't be adequate if the ATM is rebooted and both the time and transaction counter are predictable.
UN Data Collection
A. Theodore Markettos and Simon Moore first showed that a preplay attack was possible against EMV if attackers could sabotage the RNG. 7 However, before our work, there was no empirical work on the quality of the RNGs used by actual ATMs or POS terminals. To address this, we set out to collect UNs generated by ATMs and POS terminals in our area, which together with log files from legal cases gave us an initial view of the EMV system in practice.
To obtain UN data and high-resolution timestamps from ATMs, we made a set of passive monitoring cards by adding our own ATM protocol analyzer circuitry, consisting of a microcontroller and memory, to a standard debit card. This process required carefully placing and connecting small components (down to a 0.4 mm pin pitch) and custom hardware to retrieve the transaction logs. Figure 3 shows the modified card. It remains a valid payment card-the transaction flow proceeds as normal-so it should always be accepted. It can also be inserted into a variety of ATMs and POS devices without arousing suspicion. (For ethical and prudential reasons, we informed the police that such experiments were underway, and we also went through our local ethics process.)
For each ATM investigated, we harvested between five and 50 UNs by performing repeated balance inqui- 
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ries and then making a small cash withdrawal. (All ATM transactions are authenticated by EMV protocol runs, but some have a zero withdrawal amount.) We used balance inquiries to minimize the number of withdrawals and avoid triggering any fraud-monitoring systems. At POS terminals, sales assistants are often briefed to avoid handling or even looking at customer cards. So we used existing monitoring tools such as the Smart Card Detective, 8 which relies on a hidden wire running up the experimenter's sleeve.
During our UN collection campaign, we performed more than 1,000 transactions across 22 different ATMs and five POS terminals. Table 2 shows a selection of data collected from various ATMs exhibiting some ineffective algorithms. ATMs 1 and 2 contain a typical pattern, which we denote characteristic C, in which the high bit and the third nibble of each UN are always set to zero. This alone reduces the entropy of the UNs from 32 to 27 bits. Eleven of the 22 ATMs we looked at exhibited this characteristic. These included ATMs of wildly different ages running different operating systems, so we suspect it's an artifact of a particular EMV kernel postprocessing rather than of the RNG source itself. Table 3 shows a list of consecutive UNs retrieved from a local POS terminal with a stronger RNG. Even in this case, the first bit appears to remain 0, which might suggest the use of a signed integer.
Based on our analysis of RNGs from logs, ATMs, and POS terminals, we distinguish three broad classes of ineffective RNGs:
■ an obviously weak RNG algorithm, such as counters or clocks directly used as the UN, homegrown algorithms, or casting down to the wrong integer size; ■ a simple RNG with little or no seeding, such as a linear congruential generator, combinations of fixed bits and bits that cycle, or using standard C library calls such as time() and rand(); and ■ an RNG that can be put into a predictable state, such as a strong RNG fed by a weak source of randomness that's restarted on power-up or an RNG that relies only on data from previous transactions.
Harvesting the Data and Cashing Out
Given temporary access to an EMV card whose holder enters the PIN, attackers could program a terminal to read the static data from the card and call GENERATE AC to obtain an ARQC and TC for each possible UN. In this way, several dozen ARQCs can be harvested for each card. The only limitation is the time that the card can be left in a sabotaged POS while the customer believes the machine is waiting for authorization. In the Majorca ATM that started this line of research, the counter rolled over every three minutes. In this case, an attacker might ask a card in a store for 20 ARQCs around a point in the 15-bit counter's cycle. On visiting the ATM, the attacker's card would first calibrate to the ATM's counter and then initiate transactions when the counter is expected to be in the range of the captured ARQCs. Figure 4a illustrates the preplay attack based on a weak RNG.
Preplay Attack Implementation and Evaluation
In our indistinguishability experiment, we used test cards with known ARQC-generation keys to prove the attack's viability. First, we took two test cards, A and B, loaded with the same ARQC-generation keys, initialized with the same ATC, and handled identically. Then, we harvested data from card A and programmed it onto a preplay card, implemented using the Zeit Control BasicCard platform (www.basiccard.com). Finally, we compared traces between the preplay card version of card A and the real card B and observed that they were identical. This means that, at the protocol level, it's impossible for an ATM to distinguish between the real and preplay cards.
UN Modification and Other Attacks
In real life, we cannot rely on communications between the merchant and the card-issuing bank to be protected by encryption or even authentication. This is a wellknown problem from ATM networking. 9 In such cases, a man-in-the-middle device between the terminal and the bank can be used to attack systems even if their random number generation is sound. In this case, it's no longer necessary to profile an ATM or POS terminal. Attackers can simply choose an arbitrary UN and obtain the related transaction data, including the ARQC, from the victim's card. They then replay the transaction data at a terminal and replace the terminal's real UN with another one (see Figure 4b ). This could be an attractive way to attack merchants with high-value transactions, such as jewelers or investment firms. Even if merchants guard their premises and their POS equipment, attackers can go after the network link at a utility cabinet. And even if the UN generation algorithms are patched or the communication link between merchants and their issuer bank is secured, several other protocol attack variants exist.
Malware Infection
There have been numerous cases of malware-infected ATMs operating in Eastern Europe and of POS devices being infected in the US. Depending on the internal 
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architecture, it might be easy for such malware to sabotage the choice of UN. In fact, one bank suggested to us that the Majorca ATM might have been infected with malware. 10 Alternatively, the malware might collude to ensure that the UN matches the presented ARQC.
Supply-Chain Attacks
Such att acks have already occurred on POS terminals in the wild and used to harvest magnetic-strip data. Th us, it's feasible that att ackers, or even state-level adversaries, might sabotage the RNG deliberately, either to act predictably all the time or to enter a predictable mode when triggered via a covert channel. A suitably sabotaged RNG would probably be detected only via reverse engineering or by observing realworld att acks.
Collusive Merchants
In a transaction dispute, a customer claimed to have made a single small purchase at a merchant, yet the bank claimed the customer made 10 large purchases as well. Th ese large purchases were fi led via three diff erent acquirers who reported diff erent terminal characteristics despite each transaction coming from the same terminal, so the evidence of fraud is clear. Th e bank initially maintained that the transactions were the customer's fault. Th e customer hired a lawyer who engaged one of the authors as an expert witness, took the case to the Financial Ombudsman Service, and got a full refund. Banks' unwillingness to charge back such transactions to merchants, unless customers go to court, is an open incitement to merchant fraud.
Merchants might maliciously modify their EMV stack to be vulnerable or inject replayed card data into the authorization/sett lement system. Th ey could take a cut from att ackers using cloned cards at the store or just preplay transactions directly. We also have evidence of merchants tampering with transaction data to falsely represent transactions as PIN verifi ed to shift liability and cut transaction fees. In the UK, there was a string of card-cloning att acks at petrol stations in which gang members bribed store managers to look the other way when they tampered with PIN pads and inserted monitoring devices into network connections-exactly what's needed for a preplay att ack.
Limitations and Defenses
Limits on the preplay att ack's eff ectiveness relate to the data fi elds included in the MAC and the quality of the issuer's cryptographic checks. When issuers follow card scheme standards, the att acker must choose the transaction country, date, and amount in advance. Th e card's PIN must be harvested at the same time as the preplay data (or already be known). Also, subsequent use of the real card might advance the ATC kept by the card and invalidate recorded data.
Defenses against Random Number Attacks
Th e simplest fi x for random number att acks is a cryptographically secure RNG, but this isn't necessarily practical. RNG design is a matt er for the acquiring banks, ATM vendors, merchants, and POS terminal suppliers, whereas the cost of fraud falls on cardissuing banks and customers. Issuers might unilaterally try to detect evidence of harvesting, such as by identifying large gaps in ATC. Th ey should reject online transactions with out-of-order ATCs, but this is easier said than done because transaction reordering can occur in offl ine payments. We've witnessed banks processing duplicated transactions without checking ATCs.
Defenses against Protocol Attacks
In the short to medium term, issuers would do bett er to meticulously verify the TC, which the card sends to the terminal as the transaction completes and should be submitt ed to the issuer when the transaction is presented for sett lement. Th e TC states whether the card verifi ed the ARPC, which in turn was computed by the card-issuing bank aft er it verifi ed the ARQC. A preplay att ack can still yield a TC, but its IAD will show that issuer authentication didn't complete successfully.
Still, TC checking is rare. Section 5.12 of Visa's "Transaction Acceptance Device Guide" states: 11 Devices operating in a single-message or host-capture environment should ensure a TC is generated for approved transactions. Although not needed for clearing, generating a TC ensures that cards do not request unnecessary online approvals on subsequent transactions and also provides liability protection for acquirers.
Mitigating acquirer liability in the event of stand-in processing is all very well, but our concern here is cardholder liability.
In the event of a court having to decide whether a series of disputed transactions from a single terminal was made with the cardholder's collusion or via a preplay Banks' unwillingness to charge back such transactions to merchants, unless customers go to court, is an open incitement to merchant fraud.
attack, the first forensic test should be to examine the TC. If a valid TC is generated by a card following a correct ARPC that in turn followed a correct ARQC, then the card was present and active when the ARPC was generated. This doesn't exclude all possibilities of fraud, as relay attacks might occur, 12 but these are unlikely.
Discussion
In previous work, Steven J. Murdoch discussed the potential vulnerability of EMV given a poor RNG. 13 Markettos and Moore also explored how otherwise secure true RNGs could be manipulated to produce more deterministic output and how to exploit a weak RNG in an EMV transaction. 7 This article is the first work to show that EMV ATMs with poor RNGs exist in the wild, that they have been implicated in fraud, how they can be exploited, and the protocol flaws in the EMV specification that make this so hard to counter.
It's interesting to compare the preplay attack to full cloning, in which the ARQC generation keys are extracted. Full cloning might appear to be much more powerful, but because each card has its own ATC, these will diverge in due course and become detectable.
In fact, preplay attacks could be more powerful than full cloning attacks for reasons of scale. If keys could be extracted from cards at no cost-say, using a power analysis attack conducted by a rogue terminal-then cloning attacks might be done on an industrial scale. However, this is unlikely because the industry has spent 15 years and millions of dollars on countermeasures. It's more likely that cloning attacks would involve card capture followed by destructive reverse engineering and perhaps a semi-invasive attack costing tens to hundreds of dollars per card.
In contrast, preplay attacks could reach a massive scale. If an attacker succeeds in compromising several terminals (which was done in the UK by three separate gangs in the mid-2000s 14 ) or compromising the communications to several high-value stores (which was done to jewelry stores in Hatton Garden, London, in the 1980s), the cards can have ARQCs harvested in one location and presented in another. The same holds if a number of terminals are compromised by malware. E MV has been around for more than 10 years, yet attackers continue to identify serious new attack strategies. It's shocking that many ATMs and POS terminals have seriously defective RNGs that leave the system open to fraud. Even worse, the associated protocol failures are a growing real-world problem that leaves technology open to fraud at scale using malware in POS terminals. This flaw challenges current thinking about authentication. Existing verification models don't easily apply to a complex multistakeholder environment. In fact, EMV was verified to be secure. As we explained, that verification didn't work, and mechanisms for rolling out fixes across networks with huge installed bases of cards and terminals and strong externalities are nowhere near serviceable.
The structural governance failure we've exposed gives rise to systemic risk. In a multiparty world, where not even the largest card-issuing bank or acquirer or scheme operator has the power to fix a problem unilaterally, we cannot continue to rely on a slow and complex negotiation process among merchants, banks, and vendors. Regulators have been credulous in accepting industry assurances about operational risk management, and it's time for them to take an interest. The US Federal Reserve is now paying attention, but it is time for European and other regulators to follow suit.
